Earlham College Tibetan Studies Program 

Introduction

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In 1992, the Dalai Lama closed his statement ‘Guidelines for Future Tibet’s Polity’ by saying, “I hope all sincere and right-thinking Tibetans will strive with a sense of pride and joy to attain the goals I have stated in the foregoing lines.” [1] This quote reads as a request for support and solidarity from the Tibetan People. However, this paper makes the argument that this document represents part of a vision by His Holiness the Dalai Lama (HHDL); defining concepts like democracy, authority, and political philosophy for the Tibetan Government in Exile (TGiE). 

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But what is the scope of this political vision? And how and why does it define these concepts for the TGiE? This paper will first lay out a brief history of Tibetan Governance in Exile, and a background in the institution of the Dalai Lama. Then the paper will look at the roots, purpose, and intention behind the Political Vision of HHDL. Finally, there will be an analysis of existing theoretical frameworks for understanding the authority of HHDL in comparison with the Tibetan cultural understanding. 

 

The Central Tibetan Authority (CTA) represents what Fiona McConnell metaphorically termed as a ‘Rehearsal State,’ with its purpose being to establish the infrastructure of a state in exile for its hopeful application in the future. With its administrative purpose to represent the Tibetan Community in Exile (TCiE), the CTA also takes on a role of serving as an official channel for the TCiE to communicate with the international community, appealing for support towards the Tibetan struggle for self-determination [2]. 

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In tandem, the Dalai Lama to the Tibetan People represents an institution with lineage going back to 1578. To the Tibetan People, HHDL is seen as the reincarnation of Avaloketishvara, the bodhisattva of compassion, and the mythological father of the Tibetan People [3]. Now considered to be in his 14th reincarnation, HHDL enjoys the respect of the Tibetan people as a spiritual leader, although he devolved his nominal powers in 2011 [4]. As a head of state, the Dalai Lama is the historic leader of Ganden Phodrang; the traditional government of pre-1950s Tibet. This is a role that the institution of HHDL has held since the 5th Dalai Lama received nominal and spiritual powers from the Mongolian Gushi Khan in 1642 [5]. 

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It is important to note the context through which this argument is being made. In this paper, ‘Tibet’ refers to the regions currently under occupation by the People’s Republic of China. This includes the three traditional Tibetan provinces of Kham, Amdo, and U-Tsang, which cover what is now deemed by the Chinese government to be the Tibet Autonomous Region, and also encompasses parts of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces [6]. The occupation of these territories by the Chinese Government began in 1949 and led to the Dalai Lama going into exile in 1959. 

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Building the Vision

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‘Guidelines for Future Tibet’s Polity’ (GFTP) is a six-page document that gives a framework for a future government to be applied upon the “Joyful day” that Tibet can be governed by self-determination [1]. GFTP frames this future government by calling for a democratic system of rule with its associated ‘three pillars’ of separate executive, legislative, and judiciary branches. GFTP also states HHDL’s intention to devolve his nominal powers in this new government.

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GFTP also outlines details like the future government’s approach to secularism, which would incorporate the influence of Buddhist Philosophy. Additionally, GFTP outlines policy details like environmental protection, economic reform, access to education and healthcare, and the establishment of Tibet as a ‘zone of peace.’ GFTP also outlines a transitional period for the establishment of democratic elections. For this process, HHDL includes a statement calling for the amnesty of Tibetan officials who have worked with the Chinese government. 

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GFTP is part of a series of statements from HHDL over different mediums and for a range of audiences. In 1987, HHDL made a statement to the United States Congressional Human Rights Caucus titled ‘Five Point Peace Plan,’ in which he called on the Chinese Government to respect human rights in Tibet, begin earnest negotiations with the Tibetan Community in Exile, and halt the population transfer of Han Chinese into Tibetan regions. The plan also called for the establishment of Tibet as a zone of non-violence inspired by the ‘ahimsa’ ideology in Buddhist philosophy, and the environmental protection of Tibet regions [7].

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This was followed by a speech to the European Parliament in 1988 titled, the ‘Strasbourg Proposal.’ This speech proposed the establishment of Tibet as a truly autonomous region under China. This would allow the Chinese government to maintain sovereignty over Tibet while ensuring the rights to self-determination  [8]. This could be perceived as calling the Chinese Government’s bluff, because of promises made in article 4 of the Chinese Constitution. Sections 2 and 3 of this article defend autonomous rule for ethnic minority regions, and the freedom to use indigenous languages [9]. HHDL also announced in this address that he would not serve as nominal leader in a future governing scenario. 

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Following the publication of ‘Guidelines for Future Tibet’s Polity’ in 1992, Samdhong Rinpoche, the Chairman of the Assembly of Tibetan People’s Representatives expanded on the guidelines of HHDL in his 1996 document titled ‘Tibet: A Future Vision.’ Claiming to write from a place of inspiration as opposed to interpretation, Rinpoche’s writings provided specific plans for how the goals laid out in the HHDL’s 1992 document would be implemented [10]. Rinpoche’s expansions on the aforementioned goals spaned from outlining the nature of secularism in the future government to weighing the philosophical pros and cons of existing economic systems like capitalism and socialism. 

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There is a pattern of precedence setting in HHDL’s writings which seem to authorize and legitimize his ideas and claims. For example, in ‘Guidelines for Future Tibet’s Polity’ when HHDL makes the argument for his devolution of power, he acknowledges the backlash to the CTA’s 1961 constitution because of its limitations to the Dalai Lama’s power. He notes that he did not approve the 1963 revision because he found his maintenance of power in the document to be insufficiently democratic. He also cites an address he made in 1969 in which he called for the Tibetan People to decide what system of governance they wanted. Finally, he acknowledges the Tibetan People’s negative reaction to his plans to devolve his powers in the Strasbourg Proposal. 

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The Power Behind the Vision

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But what empowers this visionary writing of HHDL? And how does his influence impact the decision-making processes of the TGiE? Jane Ardley writes that through a Western perspective, the Dalai Lama appears to be an unelected monk who “holds little political legitimacy, and certainly has no position within a democratic framework.” [11] However, Ardley explains that through the traditional Tibetan framework, the Dalai Lama gains his legitimacy and authority through his status as the reincarnation of Avaloketishvara.

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 In turn, the CTA gains its legitimacy as the representative of the Exiled Tibetan Peoples because of the Dalai Lama’s previous role as the nominal leader until 2011. This was symbolically established in 1960, with a ceremony at Bodh Gaya, the place of the Buddha’s enlightenment. This ceremony, which included a prayer for HHDL’s long life cemented the CTAs claim to be the administrative representative of HHDL [6]. 

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From a theoretical perspective, the Dalai Lama’s position of authority can be interpreted through the Weberian definition of charismatic authority. In the words of Weber, 

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“Devotion to the charisma of the prophet or leader in war, or to the great demagogue in ecclesia or in parliament, recognizes that the leader is personally recognized as the innerly ‘called’ leader of men. Men do not obey him by virtue of statute, but because they believe in him.” [12]

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Ardley [11] argues that the Tibetan People’s devotion to the Dalai Lama is in the institution and reincarnation of the leader as opposed to devotion to the individual (Tenzin Gyatso). 

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Weberian theory also acknowledges the need for stability or ‘routinization’ of governance for the charismatic authority of a leader to be valid. Ardley [11]makes the argument that in the transitive nature of governing in Exile, democratization offers sustainability to the TCiE because it legitimizes the TGiE in the eyes of states ruled by rational-legal authority (bureaucratic and democratic systems). This recognition is needed for the TGiE to argue for sovereign rights to self-determination in the context of international law. 

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This dynamic of authority can be found in HHDL’s writings, which call for the Democratization of the future Tibetan Government and subsequent limiting of the Dalai Lama’s influence on political affairs. But even HHDL recognizes in his statements that his wish for his own devolution of nominal power has not been shared by the Tibetan people. Gonpo Dhundup, the president of the Tibetan Youth Congress, explained that the Tibetan people in Exile credit much of what they have today to the work of HHDL. In this sense, the Tibetan people see HHDL as a symbol of the Tibetan Community in Exile’s perseverance [13]. 

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With this narrative, the incremental application of democracy gains context, with Mr. Dhundup metaphorically describing the process of democracy in the TCiE as a “spoon feeding” by HHDL [13]. The contemporaneous views of Tibetans in exile at the time these documents were written seem to reflect this perception. In a February 1990 issue of the Tibetan Review, Pema Choepel expressed concern with the elections process in Exile citing disorganization and inexperience on the part of the electoral commission, and illiteracy and lack of information about candidates among voters [14].

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Pema Choepel also complained of disengaged public opinion when it came to democracy and noted that the public had only recently become more engaged on social issues, ironically in response to HHDL’s plans to devolve his powers in the recent Strasbourg proposal [14]. Similarly, in a January 1990 issue of The Tibetan Review, Pema Thinley wrote that they were concerned that the principle of democracy (if not applied correctly) would devolve into a “electoral farce” citing recent failures by the Khmer Rouge regime to democratize in Cambodia [15]. 

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HHDL seemed to have shared these concerns and stressed the importance of a democracy that fit the needs of the Tibetan People. In a statement to the 16th National Assembly in 1989 [16] HHDL told the assembly that to successfully implement democracy, the TGiE first needed to address the root problem (referring to his role as theocratic ruler) so as not to “patch up a bad tree.” As an example, he referred to the reluctance of the USSR to give up its control in Eastern bloc countries, citing the ineffectiveness of ‘central democratic rule. He also said that he had chosen to remain in power (for the time being) because the CTA was not yet sufficiently prepared to lead the Tibetan People. Ardley [11] also argues that the incremental adoption of democratic governance allows the traditional systems of power that ruled Lhasa before 1959 to transition into a rational-legal framework of authority, while maintaining the charismatic symbolism of the Dalai Lama. 

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Conclusion

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At a first glance, ‘Guidelines for Future Tibet’s Polity’ represents the visionary hopes of the Dalai Lama for a future Tibetan state. According the Howlett and Ramesh’s [17] synthesization of the 5-step process for policy making, the agenda setting stage of public policy can be defined as either part of a discussion agenda, or a decision agenda setting process. Along this framework, HHDL is setting democracy as a decision agenda, because he used his position of power to set a list of policy priorities for the TGiE, as opposed to the policy process beginning as a discussion agenda for the TCiE to bring to the TGiE. Although the decision-making process in the TGiE has always been the ultimate decision of the Tibetan people, it is important to note that the process was initiated by the wishes as expressed in the writings of HHDL. 

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To better understand this dynamic, this paper sought to make the argument that GFTP represents a visionary foundation for the Tibetan Community in Exile’s understandings of democracy, authority, and political philosophy. To test this hypothesis, the paper analyzed the theoretical and cultural elements that allowed these writings to define the concepts. It’s important to note that the cited documents are not the only written and addressed statements from HHDL between 1988 and 1992. Rather, these documents represent a timeline of precedence setting through writing that best represented the interpretation of authority.

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Through the theoretical framework of Weberian criteria for authority, Ardley [11] argues that the HHDL’s charismatic authority comes from the Tibetan people’s devotion to the Institution of the Dalai Lama. This accurately characterizes the Tibetan people’s responses to the HHDL’s directives. Through his charismatic authority, HHDL used language of precedence to incrementally build a process for democratization that would allow the replacement system of governance time to establish itself, while maintaining the right for the Tibetan people to choose how they wished to be governed should HHDL pass away or otherwise become unfit to lead. 

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Because of the logistical limitations to this research project, the following questions remain for further research. First, what are the ways this political vision impacts the day to day functions of the TGiE? And second, how does this vision impact civil arenas like dissent and political organizing for the Tibetan Community in Exile? Third, because of HHDL’s monastic background, what are the ways that Buddhist Philosophy specifically influences political ideology even within a secular system?